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the Friedman rule maximizes the purchasing power of money, it fails to generate the first-best
allocation of resources unless buyers have all the bargaining power.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the validity of the Friedman rule in search-theoretic models with fully di-
visible money and a degenerate distribution of money holdings. In the absence of distorting
taxes and search externalities, these models generate contradictory conclusions regarding
the ability of the Friedman rule to guarantee an e!cient allocation of resources. In Shi
(1997, 1999, 2001) and in Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003) the Friedman rule generates
the first-best allocation. In contrast, in Rauch (2000) and Lagos and Wright (2001) the
Friedman rule only generates a second-best allocation, unless buyers have all the bargaining
power, because the first-best would require deflation at a greater rate than the Friedman
rule, which is inconsistent with the existence of a steady-state monetary equilibrium.1
In order to shed light on what the Friedman rule can accomplish in a search envi-
ronment with fully divisible money, we modify Shi’s (1997, 1999, 2001) framework in the
following way. As in Shi’s framework, we assume that the economy is populated by house-
holds consisting of a large number of members that pool together their money holdings
after trading, which renders the distribution of money holdings degenerate.2 In contrast to
Shi’s approach, but as in Rauch (2000), we assume that the bargaining strategies take into
account the money holdings of the traders in a match. In comparison with Rauch (2000),
our analysis has three distinctive features. First, we consider alternating oer bargaining
games to determine the quantities traded in each match. The sequential bargaining proce-
dure, in contrast to the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution, makes clear how the agents’
behavior in out-of-equilibrium matches prevents the economy from attaining the first best
under the Friedman rule. Second, we consider how buyers’ bargaining power aects the
purchasing power of money. Third, we allow for money hoarding by letting households
choose the amount of money their members carry to the search market. This eliminates
stationary monetary equilibria where the gross growth rate of the money supply is smaller
than the discount factor.
The following results emerge from our paper. First, the frameworks of Shi (1997, 1999,
2001) and Lagos and Wright (2001) have equivalent closed-form solutions. This result is
noteworthy, because Lagos and Wright and Shi use dierent formalization strategies to
obtain a degenerate distribution of money holdings.3 Second, and more importantly, we
show that the dierent results in the literature are due to the presence of one term in the
envelope condition, which reflects how agents expect other agents to react in response to
1We restrict our attention to search models with degenerate distributions because it is well known that
with nondegenerate distributions expansionary monetary policies can be beneficial (Deviatov and Wallace
2001; Molico 1997). For a survey on the optimum quantity of money, see Woodford (1990).
2The large-household assumption, extending a similar one in Lucas (1990), avoids di!culties that arise
in models with a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings, and so allows for a tractable analysis of
money growth and inflation. In a series of papers, Shi (1997, 1999, 2001) has explored the use of this
assumption in search models of money.
3Lagos and Wright (2001) assume that, after the random-matching market closes, a Walrasian market
opens in which agents can trade a homogeneous good for money. They show that if the traders have
quasi-linear preferences for this good, all agents leave the Walrasian market with the same amount of
money.
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an out-of-equilibrium change of their money holdings.
All models have in common that in each period the households make two decisions:
they determine the trading strategies for their members, where a trading strategy instructs
a member which oer to make and which oers to accept (a reservation utility) in the
bargaining process; and they choose with how much money their members enter the search
market. The crucial feature of Shi’s approach is that the trading strategies are not con-
tingent on the money holdings of the potential opponents in bargaining. They only take
into account the amount of money that agents hold in equilibrium. Because of this, when
a buyer and a seller meet and the buyer’s money holdings diers from what is expected in
equilibrium, the seller’s reservation utility is left unchanged.4 In contrast, in Rauch (2000)
and in Lagos and Wright (2001) the bargaining strategies are match-specific, i.e. they
take into account the money holdings of the buyer in a match. In the symmetric equilib-
rium, the money holdings of all agents in the market are equal (the distribution of money
holdings is degenerate), and so all agents make the same equilibrium oers and have the
same reservation values. Nevertheless, a seller’s reservation utility in an out-of-equilibrium
match diers from the reservation utility in equilibrium.
The change of sellers’ reservation utilities in out-of-equilibrium matches is the reason
why in Rauch (2000) and in Lagos and Wright (2001) the economy cannot attain the first-
best under the Friedman rule. Because of this change, a buyer who brings an additional
unit of money into a match cannot extract the whole surplus that this unit provides to the
match, which lowers the marginal value of money. In this sense, money is an asset whose
holder – the buyer – is not able to capture its entire return. As pointed out by Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999), this holdup ine!ciency is very common in search models with ex post
bargaining. Because the Friedman rule only compensates for the time impatience of agents,
correction of this holdup ine!ciency requires a higher rate of deflation than the rate of time
preference, which is inconsistent with the existence of a steady-state monetary equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its main assump-
tions. Section 3 derives the symmetric equilibrium and Section 4 identifies the crucial
dierence in the specification of the envelope condition of the two approaches. The Fried-
man rule is investigated in Section 5, followed by a discussion of our results in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The environment
The environment is similar to that of Shi (1997, 1999, 2001). Time is discrete. The economy
consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived households that specialize in consumption and
production. There are K  3 types of goods and K types of households. Households are
4A trading strategy in Shi’s model is not a complete plan of actions that specifies what a member
has to do in all circumstances. In this sense, the sellers are like vending machines that are programmed
in advance to accept any oer that gives them some reservation value. See also our discussion of Shi’s
approach in Section 6.
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uniformly distributed among types. A household of type n produces good n and consumes
good n + 1 (modulo K). Denote by }  1K the single-coincidence-of-wants probability.
Each household consists of a continuum of members, normalized to one, who carry out
dierent tasks but regard the household’s utility as the common objective. In order to
avoid any incentive problems by the members, we assume that each household knows what
happens to its members on the search market (who matches with whom, the bargaining
process etc.) so it can punish members who fail to carry out the proposed equilibrium
strategy.5 We focus on a representative household, which we call household k. Decision
variables of household k are denoted by lowercase letters. Capital letters denote other
households’ variables. Furthermore, variables corresponding to the next period are indexed
by +1, and variables corresponding to the previous period are indexed by 1.
At the beginning of each period, household k holds p units of money. These p units
of money can be either hoarded or distributed across members in order to be spent on the
search market. Let |  p be the number of units that each member carries in a match. In
search models with divisible money it is usually assumed that agents bring all their money
holdings into the matches, i.e., | = p. An explicit hoarding decision (choice of |) ensures
that no monetary equilibrium exists if the rate of growth of the money supply is smaller
than what is prescribed by the Friedman rule ( ? ).
Once members are matched, the household instructs them on how to bargain. Since
goods and money are perfectly divisible, agents can exchange any quantity of money and
goods they wish, provided that the traded quantity of money does not exceed the money
holdings of the buyer in the match. After trading, household members consume the ac-
quired goods and then return home and pool together their receipts of money. At the
end of a period, each household receives a lump-sum transfer of money  , which can be
negative. The gross growth rate of the money supply is  = P+1@P , where P is the
money supply per household in period w.
For each member of household k, consumption of t units of good k+1 provides utility
x(t), where x(=) is a twice continuously dierentiable function with x(0) = 0, x0(t) A 0,
x0(0) =4, and x00(t) ? 0. Production of t units of good k provides disutility f(t), where
f(=) is a twice continuously dierentiable function with f(0) = 0, f0(t) A 0, f0(0) = 0, and
f00(t) A 0. We assume that there exists tW ? +4 that satisfies x0(tW) = f0(tW).
All through the paper we restrict our attention to values of t such that x(t) f(t)  0.
The utility of the household is defined as the discounted sum of the consumption utilities
of all its members minus their production costs. The discount factor for the household is
 5 (0> 1). Finally, if Y (p) denotes the lifetime expected utility of an household endowed
with p units of money, the marginal value of money is $ = Y 0(p+1).
5An alternative assumption, which is equivalent with respect to its implications for the model, would
be to assume that all family members are robots, which act according to the program installed by the
household instead of enjoying or suering their own utility or disutility. Either specification rules out
potential incentive problems members may have. For example, why an atomless seller is willing to suer
the disutility of production, as opposed to claim not meeting a buyer, when his tomorrow’s money holdings
do not depend on his action today.
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2.2 Bargaining
Each agent in the market is endowed with money and with a production opportunity, and
therefore each agent is a potential buyer and a potential seller. When two agents meet, the
match is either a single-coincidence meeting, where one agent (the buyer) is a consumer of
the good produced by the other agent (the seller), or a no-coincidence meeting. Terms of
trade are determined in alternating-oer bargaining games. In contrast to Shi’s approach,
households condition their bargaining strategies on the money holdings of their bargaining
partners. For this to be feasible, we assume that in a match the level of money holdings
of each trader is common knowledge.
The marginal value of money of a household, however, is not observable. Nevertheless,
in a symmetric equilibrium all households have the same marginal value for money, and in
the bargaining they attribute to each other the value l that prevails in equilibrium. There
is no obvious way to address the issue of which value for the marginal utility of money
k’s partners will attribute to k if k deviates from its equilibrium strategy, for instance by
accumulating more money. Throughout the paper, we assume that in out-of-equilibrium
matches the bargaining partners still attribute to each other the value l that prevails in
equilibrium.6
Without loss of generality, we consider the bargaining between agent l, who is a rep-
resentative member of household k, and a randomly chosen agent of another household,
whom we will call agent m. Agent l’s decision variables are denoted by lowercase letters,
whereas decision variables of agent m are denoted by capital letters. Each period is divided
into a large number of subperiods of length {. If, in a given subperiod, it is agent l’s turn
to make an oer and agent m rejects the oer, then agent m makes a counteroer in the fol-
lowing subperiod. There is an exogenous risk of a breakdown of the negotiation each time
an oer has been rejected. This breakdown risk diers for sellers and buyers. If the seller
has rejected the buyer oer, the breakdown probability is { with 0 ?   1. If the buyer
has rejected the seller oer, the breakdown probability is (1 ){. Because the length
of a subperiod is small, { and (1  ){ are assumed to be smaller than one. Finally,
we assume that members of the representative household k make always the first oer.
This simplifies the exposition, but does not aect the results, because we will consider the
bargaining game when { goes to zero, where the first-mover advantage vanishes.
Assume first that agent l is the buyer. Then agent l proposes the oer
¡
te> {e
¢
, where
te = te (|> \ ) is the quantity of goods produced by his partner in exchange for {e = {e (|> \ )
units of money, where the oer
¡
te> {e
¢
may depend on the money holdings of buyer l, |,
and the money holdings of seller m, \ . If seller m accepts the oer, the acquired money {e
will add to m’s household at the beginning of the next period, whose value today is l{e.7
6If the marginal value of money  is common knowledge in a match, then we get the same result under
symmetric bargaining. However, under asymmetric bargaining the model cannot be solved analytically
because one derivative cannot be determined (see Section 6).
7To see why, suppose that the measure of a member is . Then for the household, the value of {
additional units of money received by a member is  [Y (p+1 + {) Y (p+1)]. To express the value of {
additional units of money for a member, we must multiply this quantity by the scale factor 1@. Because
members are atomistic, we let  $ 0 to get lim$0 [Y (p+1 + {) Y (p+1)]@ = {Y 0(p+1) = {$.
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Any optimal oer must make seller m indierent between accepting and rejecting the oer:
f(te) + {el = Uv (1)
where Uv = Uv (|> \ ) is seller m’s reservation value which may also depend on buyer l’s and
seller m’s money holdings | and \ , respectively.
Assume now that agent l is the seller. Then agent l proposes the oer (tv> {v), where
tv = tv (|> \ ) is the quantity of goods produced by his partner in exchange for {v = {v (|> \ )
units of money, where the oer
¡
te> {e
¢
may depend on the money holdings of seller l, |,
and the money holdings of buyer m, \ . To be optimal, seller l’s oer (tv> {v) must satisfy
x(tv) {vl = Ue (2)
where Ue = Ue (|> \ ) is buyer m’s reservation value which may also depend on seller l’s and
buyer m’s money holdings | and \ , respectively.
The reservation values of sellers and buyers satisfy
Uv = (1 {) [f(Tv) +[vl] (3)
Ue = (1 (1 ){)
£
x(Te)[el
¤
(4)
According to (3), if with probability 1  { there is no breakdown of the negotiation
after a seller has rejected a buyer oer, the seller makes the counteroer (Tv>[v) where
Tv = Tv (|> \ ) and [v = [v (|> \ ) may depend on | and \ . The reservation value of a
buyer (4) has a similar interpretation.
3 Symmetric Monetary Equilibrium
Now we can describe household k’s choice problem. When the household determines the
terms of trade, it is subject to two constraints. First, household members cannot spend
more money than what they have:
{e  | (5)
Second, household members cannot ask for more money than what their bargaining partner
holds:
{v  \ (6)
A household’s trading strategy consists of the terms of trades
¡
te> {e
¢
and (tv> {v), and ac-
ceptance rules for the oers
¡
Te> [e
¢
and (Tv>[v) by other households. Let  in R+ denote
the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (5),  5 R+ the Lagrange multiplier
associated with constraint (6), and ! 5 R+ the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
constraint |  p. Taking the bargaining strategies of other households and the distribu-
tion of money holdings as given, in each period the household chooses
¡
p+1> |> te> {e> tv> {v
¢
Thus, from the point of view of the household, {$ is a member’s indirect utility of receiving { units of
money in a match.
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to solve the following dynamic programming problem:
Y (p) = max
te>tv>{e>{v>|>p+1
}
Z ©
x(te) f(tv) + 
¡
|  {e
¢
+ (\  {v) + ! (p |) + Y (p+1)} gI (\ ) (7)
subject to the constraints (1), (2), and
p+1 p =  + }
Z ©
{v  {e
ª
gI (\ ) (8)
where I (\ ) is the distribution of money holdings across traders in the market and where
the terms of trade
¡
te> {e
¢
and (tv> {v) are functions of \ .
Equality (8) describes the law of motion of the household’s money balances. The first
term on the right-hand side is the lump-sum transfer of currency that the household receives
each period. The second term specifies sellers’ expected money receipts from selling minus
the buyers’ expected expenses from buying goods.
Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria where all trad-
ing partners of household k hold the same amount of money \ . In such a symmetric
environment and if we use (1), (2), and (8) to eliminate {e, {v, and p+1 from (7), respec-
tively, then household k solves the following maximization problem
Y (p) = max
{te>tv>|>p+1}
}
£
x(te) f(tv) + 
¡
| 
¡
Uv + f
¡
te
¢¢
@l
¢
+ 
¡
\ +
¡
Ue  x(tv)
¢
@l
¢¤
+! (p |) + Y (p+  + }
¡
x(tv)Ue
¢
@l }
¡
Uv + f
¡
te
¢¢
@l)= (9)
The oers
¡
te> {e
¢
and (tv> {v) satisfy the following conditions:
x0(te) =
+ $
l
f0(te) (10)
f0(tv) =
$  
l
x0(tv) (11)

¡
{e  |
¢
= 0 (12)
 ({v  \ ) = 0 (13)
Equations (10) and (11) are the first-order conditions with respect to te and tv, and equa-
tions (12) and (13) are the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the inequalities (5) and (6), respec-
tively. Note that the first-best allocation requires t = tW, where tW satisfies x0(tW) = f0(tW).
This condition maximizes the total surplus in each match and the utility of the represen-
tative household. If the constraints (5) and (6) are not binding ( =  = 0), the quantities
produced and exchanges are e!cient, i.e. te = tv = tW. If the constraints are binding
(>  A 0), then te> tv ? tW.8
8See the Appendix for a derivation of the terms of trade.
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To determine the amount of money the household disburses to its members, dierentiate
(9) with respect to | to get
} (+ $)
µ
1
Uv|
l
¶
 ! $}  0 (= 0 if | A 0) (14)
where Uv| is the partial derivative of a seller’s reservation utility with respect to the buyer’s
money holding |. Note that Ue| = 0 in (14) because a seller’s constraint on money holdings
is never binding, which implies that the partial derivative of a buyer’s reservation utility is
not aected when a seller of the representative household arrives with one additional unit
of money in a match.
Finally, dierentiating (9) with respect to p gives the following envelope condition:
$31

= !+ $ (15)
In a monetary equilibrium, | A 0, substituting (14) into the envelope condition (15) gives
$31

= } (+ $)
µ
1
Uv|
l
¶
+ (1 })$= (16)
Eliminating  by its expression given in (10) and taking into account that in a symmetric
equilibrium $ = l and te = t, yields
$31 = 
½
}$
x0(t)
f0(t)
µ
1
Uv|
$
¶
+ (1 })$
¾
(17)
The envelope condition (17) can be interpreted in the same way as an asset pricing equation.
The left-hand side is the value in terms of utility of an additional unit of money at the end
of the previous period. The right-hand side is the discounted value of holding this unit in
the current period before the traders are matched. In the current period, with probability
} a member is in a match where he can buy consumption goods. He acquires the goods
if their consumption utility $(1  Uv|@$)x0(t)@f0(t) is larger than the indirect utility of
hoarding the money $. With probability 1  }, a member has no opportunity to spend
it, and consequently it is saved, which yields indirect utility $. The term Uv|@$ can be
interpreted as a markup imposed by the seller.
By using  = p@p31 (17) can be transformed to display the evolution of the real value
of money holdings p$:
(p$)31
p$
=


½
}
x0(t)
f0(t)
µ
1
Uv|
$
¶
+ (1 })
¾
(18)
In the following, we will focus our attention on equilibria where the real value of money
holdings p$ is constant. In such a steady-state monetary equilibrium the envelope condi-
tion (18) can be written as follows:
  
}
=
x0(t)
f0(t)
µ
1
Uv|
$
¶
 1 (19)
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Note that the envelope conditions in Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003), Lagos and Wright
(2001), Rauch (2000), and Shi (1997, 1999, 2001) dier only in the specification of the
holdup term Uv| in (19). We will derive and discuss the role of the term Uv| for the dierent
models in Section 4.
Before we do so, however, let us discuss the role of money hoarding in this model. In
the introduction, we claimed that if we allow for money hoarding by letting the households
choose the amount of money their members carry to the search market, then steady-state
monetary equilibria with  ?  cannot exist. To see that this claim is true, note that
in a monetary equilibrium, (14) holds with equality. Consequently, because the Lagrange
multiplier ! is non-negative, in a symmetric steady-state monetary equilibrium (10) and
(14) imply that
x0(t)
f0(t)
µ
1
Uv|
$
¶
 1= (20)
Consider (18) and assume that  ? . Then, (20) implies that (p$)31 @p$ A 1, i.e. the
real value of money converges to 0. Thus, if  ?  there exists no symmetric steady-state
monetary equilibrium.9
4 The hold-up term Uv|
We first consider the case where households’ trading strategies are not contingent on the
money holdings of the potential opponents in bargaining. Thus, when they choose their
money holdings households take the reservation values Uv of all other households as given.
Consequently, Uv| = 0 so that the envelope condition (19) reduces to
  
}
=
x0(t)
f0(t)
 1 (21)
This would be the case, for example, if sellers could not observe buyers’ money holdings.
To derive Uv| when the households condition their trading strategies on the money
holdings of their trading partners, note that from (3) Uv| satisfies
Uv| = (1 {)
·
f0(Tv)
CTv
C|
+ l
C[v
C|
¸
(22)
From (22), when { goes to zero, the change in the seller’s reservation value Uv| is given by
Uv| = f
0(Tv)
CTv
C|
+
C[v
C|
l
9Finally, if  = , there exists a continuum of steady-state monetary equilibria with identical terms
of trade satisfying
¡
1Uv|@$
¢
x0(t)@f0(t) = 1. These equilibria only dier in their constant value of p$.
Because there exists no steady-state equilibrium when  ?  and a continuum of equilibria with money
hoarding when  = , we assume for the rest of the paper that  A .
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Wewill demonstrate later that in a monetary equilibrium the constraints on money holdings
(5) and (6) are binding, which implies that (Tv>[v) = (t(|)> |).10 Thus, if the constraint
of the buyer (5) is binding
Uv| = f
0(t)t0(|) + $ (23)
In a symmetric equilibrium where l = $ and \ = |, the quantity of goods produced and
exchanged t(|) is implicitly defined by11
f0(t)
x0(t)
=
 [f(t) + |$]
(1 ) [x(t) |$]
(24)
Note from (24) that the surpluses of buyers and sellers satisfy
x(t) |$ = X (t) [x(t) f(t)] (25)
f(t) + |$ = (1X (t)) [x(t) f(t)] (26)
where X (t) = x
0(t)
x0(t)+(13)f0(t) is a buyer’s share of the total match surplus. Note that
X (t) A  if the trade is constrained by the buyer’s money holdings. Thus, the division of
the total surplus is determined by how severely the trade is constrained by the buyer’s real
money balance, and hence influenced by monetary policy. When money growth obeys the
Friedman rule, the money constraint does not bind and so X (t) = .
Then from equation (25) we obtain
|$ = j(t; )  [1X(t)]x(t) +X(t)f(t) (27)
Total dierentiating (27), we obtain12
t0(|) =
$
j0(t; )
(28)
Use (28) to eliminate t0(|) in (23) to get
Uv| =
f0(t)
j0(t; )
$ + $ (29)
Finally, use (29) to eliminate Uv| from (19) to obtain
  
}
=
x0(t)
j0(t; )
 1 (30)
10If they were not binding, then (Tv>[v) = (t> {) where t is the e!cient quantity and { ? |.
Consequently, Uv| = 0. Note that Uv| is not continuous at t = t. We therefore adopt the convention that
Uv| is equal to its left derivative at this point, that is, Uv|
¯
t=t = limt$t U
v
|.
11For details, see the Appendix.
12To compute this derivative, we use the assumption discussed above that in the bargaining the traders
attribute to each other the economy-wide average value  for the indirect marginal utility of money. See
Section 6 and the Appendix for a discussion for the case of an observable .
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where
j0(t; ) =
(1 ) {f00(t)x0(t) x00(t)f0(t)} [x(t) f(t)] + f0(t)x0(t) [x0(t) + (1 )f0(t)]
[x0(t) + (1 )f0(t)]2
=
Equation (30) equals the envelope condition in Lagos and Wright (2001). This result is
of particular interest because our model diers in two respects from Lagos and Wright
(2001). First, we use a dierent formalization devise to render the distribution of money
holdings degenerate (the large household). Second, we consider a sequential bargaining
game and not the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution as they do. Furthermore, for  = 1
2
and x(t) = t equation (30) replicates the envelope condition of Rauch (2000, eq. (25)),
who also imposes the axiomatic symmetric Nash bargaining solution. Finally, note that
when  = 1 the envelope condition (30) collapses to (21).
5 The Friedman rule
The Friedman rule requires deflating the nominal stock of money approximately at the
rate of time preference. Because the utility of a representative household is } [x(t) f(t)],
the Friedman rule is optimal in our model if the monetary policy that consists of setting
 =  asymptotically maximizes the purchasing power of money by bringing t as close as
possible to tW.
In Shi (1997, 1999, 2001) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003) the envelope condition
is given by (21); this implies that the Friedman rule holds for any value of  because t
approaches tW as  tends to . Thus, in these models the Friedman rule attains the first-
best allocation. The reason for this result is that a buyer can get the full return on his
marginal unit of money, because of the inability of sellers to capture part of the surplus
that an additional unit of money generates for the match.
In the following we consider the validity of the Friedman rule when the households
condition their bargaining strategies on the money holdings of their trading partners as
in Rauch (2000) and Lagos and Wright (2001). For this purpose, we use equation (30) to
define a symmetric monetary steady-state equilibrium.
Definition 1 For all  A , a symmetric monetary steady-state equilibrium is a t A 0
satisfying equation (30).
For the following Proposition we assume that limt<0
x0(t)
j0(t;) = 4. This condition is a
su!cient condition to guarantee the existence of a monetary equilibrium. It is satisfied,
for example, for x(t) = td and f(t) = te with 0 ? d ? 1 ? e.
Proposition 1 If  = 1, for all  A  a unique symmetric monetary steady-state equi-
librium exists and lim< t = tW. If  5 (0> 1), for all  A  there exists a symmetric
monetary steady-state equilibrium such that lim< t = tˆ() ? tW, where tˆ() is defined as
the value of t that satisfies x0 (t) = j0(t; ).
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Proof. Define[(t; ) = x
0(t)
j0(t;) . Assume first that  = 1. The envelope condition is identical
to (21), i.e. [(t; 1) = x
0(t)
f0(t) . The function [(t; 1) is strictly decreasing, [(0; 1) = +4, and
[(tW; 1) = 1. Therefore, for all  A  there is a unique monetary equilibrium. Furthermore,
t is a decreasing function of , and lim< t = tW.
Assume next that  ? 1. From the definition in the Proposition tˆ() is the value of t
such that [(t; ) = 1. Note that tˆ() ? tW for all  ? 1. The function [(t; ) is continuous
for all t 5 (0> tˆ()], [(0; ) = +4, and [(tˆ(); ) = 1. Therefore, for all  A  there exists
a t 5 (0> tˆ()] such that (30) holds. Finally, the continuity of [(=) implies that there exists
a monetary equilibrium such that lim< t = tˆ() ? tW.
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Figure 1. Determination of the equilibrium.
The determination of the equilibrium value t, denoted th(), is illustrated in Figure 1
above. The first curve represents the right-hand side of (30) when  ? 1 and the second
curve the right-hand side of (30) when  = 1. The quantity bt() is the quantity attained
under the Friedman rule ( $ ). Note that any equilibrium quantity th()  bt() can
be replicated in the model without a hold-up problem, i.e. in Shi’s approach, by simply
increasing the gross growth rate  appropriately as indicated by the term U
v
|x0(t)
$x0(t) .¥
Proposition 1 confirms that the optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule. This
result is robust, because it is shared by all search models with divisible money, divisible
goods, and a degenerate distribution of money holdings. Thus, in the absence of distribu-
tional eects such as those studied by Deviatov and Wallace (2001) and Molico (1997) and
in the absence of search externalities as studied in Berentsen, Rocheteau, and Shi (2001),
there is no welfare gain by choosing a rate of growth of the money supply larger than what
is prescribed by the Friedman rule.
Nonetheless, according to Proposition 1, for  ? 1, the Friedman rule fails to generate
the e!cient quantity of trade in each match. This ine!ciency arises because at the time of
production agents cannot contract with their future trading partners how much consump-
tion goods they will receive in return for the acquired money. Accordingly, when buyers
11
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spend an additional unit of money, the cost of acquiring the unit is sunk, and consequently
they are not able to appropriate the full return of a marginal unit of money, unless they
have all the bargaining power. This ine!ciency is due to a standard holdup problem, which
arises in environments with bargaining and incomplete contracts. If buyers cannot get the
full return of an additional unit of money, they reduce their initial investment, that is, they
produce less to obtain the unit. This ine!ciency cannot be corrected by the Friedman rule:
The Friedman rule only corrects ine!ciencies that are associated with the fact that agents
discount future utilities.
Correction of the holdup ine!ciency would require a higher rate of deflation than
the Friedman rule, which is inconsistent with the existence of a steady-state monetary
equilibrium when agents are allowed to hoard money. Such a policy would be only feasible
if the households were constrained to bring either no money or all their money holdings
into the matches. This explains why the first-best allocation can be attained in models
with indivisible money, in which agents use lotteries to determine the terms of trade even
though a holdup problem similar to the one emphasized in this paper exists (e.g. Berentsen,
Molico, and Wright 2002). With indivisible money buyers cannot hoard money, i.e. they
are technically forced to bring all their money holdings into a match. If we had constrained
the household to redistribute all its money across members at the beginning of each period,
i.e., | = p, then the optimal gross growth rate of the money supply W would have been
smaller than the discount factor  for all  5 (0> 1) and would have guaranteed the first-best
allocation.
6 Discussion
In this Section we first illustrate the determination of the terms of trade and the real value
of money in Shi’s approach and in the models of Lagos and Wright (2001) and Rauch
(2000). We then discuss the formation of the terms of trade when the marginal value
of money $ is observable. Finally, we conclude Section 6 with an interpretation of Shi’s
approach.
Determination of the terms of trade and the real value of money Figure 2 plots
the buyer’s surplus, x(t)  |$, as a function of the quantity traded, t, for the dierent
pricing mechanisms investigated in the paper. First, if the buyer has all the bargaining
power,  = 1, the buyer’s surplus is equal to x(t)f(t). This function reaches a maximum
at t = tW. This can be seen from the curve labelled x(t)  f(t) in Figure 2. Second, if
the seller has some bargaining power and if the seller’s reservation utility Uv is not made
contingent on the buyer’s money holdings, as in Shi’s approach (1997), then the buyer’s
surplus is x(t)  f(t) Uv. Again, this function attains its maximum at t = tW. In both
cases, the buyer has full bargaining power on his marginal unit of money which explains
why his surplus is maximized at t = tW. If the opportunity cost of holding money is zero,
which is achieved through the Friedman rule, then the quantity traded will maximize the
buyer’s surplus, i.e. t = tW. Third, if the seller’s acceptance rule is made contingent on
12
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the level of money holdings of the buyer in bargaining, as in Lagos and Wright (2002)
and Rauch (2000), then the surplus of the buyer is x(t) j(t; ). This function reaches a
maximum at t = tˆ ? tW. It is labelled x(t) j(t; ) in Figure 2.
In order to see how the hold-up problem aects the terms of trade in an out-of-
equilibriummatch, assume that the same equilibrium quantityT is traded in Shi’s approach
and in Lagos andWright (2001) or Rauch (2000) (see Figure 2). Then, any dierences in the
two models arise in out-of-equilibrium matches only (when the buyer’s money holdings is
dierent from the equilibrium amountP). The dierent behavior in an out-of-equilibrium
match is reflected in the dierent slopes of the functions x(t) f(t)Uv and x(t)j(t> )
at t = T (see Figure 2). The curve that represents the buyer’s surplus in Shi’s framework
is steeper than the curve that represents Lagos and Wright (2001) or Rauch (2000) because
in Shi’s framework the buyer gets the full return on his marginal unit of money.
)()( qcqu
Buyer’s surplus
*q
);()( qgqu
Q
sRqcqu  )()(
qˆ
Figure 2. Determination of the terms of trade.
Finally, the fact that the buyer’s surplus slops downward when t 5 (tˆ> tW) reflects
the presence of the hold-up problem. If t A bt and if a buyer brings an additional unit
of money into a match, the increase of the seller’s reservation value reduces the buyer’s
surplus. Consequently, the value of an additional unit of money in such a match is smaller
than $ when t A bt so that household prefer to hoard money. Hence, no steady-state
monetary equilibrium can exist with t 5 (tˆ> tW).
Observable marginal value of money $ Throughout the paper we have assumed that
in a match the marginal value of money $ is private information. If, instead, the marginal
value of money $ is observable, the envelope condition (see Appendix 2 for the derivation)
becomes
  
}
=
x0 (t)
j0(t; )
+
% (1 2)x0 (t) f0 (t)
j0(t; ) [x0(t) + (1 )f0(t)]
 1> (31)
where % = g$g|
|
$ is the elasticity of the marginal value of money with respect to |.
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The novelty is the second term on the right-hand side of (31), which we refer to as
the strategic eect. The strategic eect captures how the terms-of-trade are aected when
the marginal value of money changes in an out-of-equilibrium match. While the hold-up
problem (represented by the first term on the right-hand side of (31)) always depresses
the value of money, the impact of the strategic eect depends on % and . If the marginal
value of money is decreasing in money holdings p and if  ? 1@2, the strategic eect
depresses the value of money even further. In contrast if  A 1@2, it has a positive impact
on the equilibrium value of money. The problem is that we cannot say anything about the
overall eect because we cannot derive the elasticity %. Note however that with symmetric
bargaining ( = 1@2) the elasticity % vanishes in (31). Consequently, if  = 1@2, then the
model generates the same envelope condition regardless of whether the marginal value of
money is assumed to be observable or not. Finally, in Lagos and Wright (2001) there is no
strategic eect because the marginal value of money $ is a market price which is taken as
given by all agents.
Interpretation of the dierent approaches Shi’s approach and the approach by
Rauch (2000) have in common that they involve trading mechanisms that generate al-
locations in the pairwise meetings that are incentive-feasible and pairwise Pareto e!cient.
That is, both approaches select an allocation on the Pareto frontier of each bargaining
set in each meeting. The main dierence is that in Shi’s approach the buyers have the
full bargaining power on their marginal unit of money, which involves dierent bargaining
weights in equilibrium and in out-of-equilibrium matches. To the extent that choosing an
allocation for a bilateral match always involves some arbitrariness, one trading mechanism
is not a priori more reasonable than another. Dierent trading mechanisms involve dierent
protocols of bargaining (extensive forms) and the protocols might depend on the charac-
teristics of the players, that is, there might be dierent protocols for equilibrium matches
and out-of-equilibrium matches, where a player holds a dierent amount of money than
what is expected in equilibrium.13
Finally, as mentioned before, in Lagos and Wright (2001) agents can trade money in a
centralized market at some given market price $. Lagos and Wright (2001) show that if the
agents have quasi-linear preferences, then the distribution of money holdings in the search
market will be degenerate. In the present paper we have seen that the closed form solutions
in Shi’s approach (in the version of Rauch with the hold-up problem) and in Lagos and
Wright are identical. Consequently, the main dierence between the approaches of Lagos
and Wright and Shi is that in Shi the pooling of money holdings is within households
whereas in Lagos and Wright the pooling of money holdings is among all agents in the
economy, which implies that in Shi the marginal value of money $ is household specific
whereas in Lagos and Wright it is a market price. The models have in common that
the pooling generates degenerate distributions of money holdings, which renders tractable
models of fully divisible money.
13Another paper that assumes that a player’s bargaining weight is a function of the match type is
Ravikumar and Wallace (2003).
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7 Conclusion
This paper has studied the optimality of the Friedman-rule in search-theoretic models
with divisible money, divisible goods, and a degenerate distribution of money holdings.
The following results have emerged from our analysis. First, we have shown that the
dierent formalization devices proposed by Shi (1997, 1999, 2001) and by Lagos andWright
(2001) are equivalent with respect to their closed-form solutions. Second, in the absence of
search externalities and distributional issues, the Friedman rule is the optimal monetary
policy. Third, we have explained the dierent results with respect to the e!ciency of the
monetary equilibrium under the Friedman rule reported in the search literature of divisible
money. If, as in Shi’s approach and in Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003), the households
do not condition their trading strategies on the money holdings of their potential trading
partners, the Friedman rule implements the first best. In contrast, if, as in Lagos and
Wright (2001) and in Rauch (2000), the households condition their bargaining strategies
on money holdings, then the Friedman rule does not guarantee the first best, unless buyers
have all the bargaining power. The reason for this ine!ciency is a holdup problem. A
buyer who holds more money than what is expected in equilibrium cannot appropriate the
entire surplus that this additional money provides to a match. In this sense, money is an
asset whose holder – the buyer – is not able to capture its entire return, which results
in an ine!ciently low purchasing power of money even under the Friedman rule.
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Appendix 1: Determination of the terms of trade Let us consider the bargaining
solution in a single-coincidence meeting between a buyer of some household and a seller
from some other household. In a symmetric equilibrium both agents hold \ units of money
and the marginal value of money value for both households is l. Then, from (1), (2), (3)
and (4) in a symmetric equilibrium (Te>[e) and (Tv>[v) satisfy
f(Te) +[el = (1 {) [f(Tv) +[vl] >
x(Tv)[vl = [1 (1 ){]
£
x(Te)[el
¤
These two equations can be rewritten as
(1 {)f(Tv) f(Te) =
£
(1 {)[v [e
¤
l> (32)
x(Tv) [1 (1 ){]x(Te) =
£
[v  [1 (1 ){][e
¤
l (33)
From these equations, we deduce that as {$ 0, Tv and Te converge to the same value T
and that [v and [v converge to the same value [. Then, rewrite (32) and (33) to get£
f(Te) +[el
¤
 [f(Tv) +[vl] = { [f(Tv) +[vl] > (34)
[x(Tv)[vl]
£
x(Te)[el
¤
= (1 ){
£
x(Te)[el
¤
(35)
Take the ratio of (32) and (33) and use the fact that [v = [e = [ to obtain
f(Tv) f(Te)
x(Tv) x(Te)
=
 [f(Tv) +[l]
(1 ) [x(Te)[l]
(36)
Take the limit as Tv and Te converge to T to get
f0(T)
x0(T)
=
 [f(T) +[l]
(1 ) [x(T)[l]
(37)
We have to distinguish two cases. If the constraint (5) of the buyer’s money holdings is
binding, i.e.  A 0, then [ = \ and T = t (\ ) ? tW, where tW is the socially e!cient
value of t that satisfies x0 (t) = f0 (t).14 Note that if we replace T by t and \l by |$,
then (37) is equal to (24).15 If the constraint (5) is not binding ( =  = 0), then T = tW,
and [  \ , where from (37) [ satisfies
[ =
(1 )x(tW) + f(tW)
l
=
Finally, note that terms of trade that we derived from a sequential bargaining procedure
satisfy the Nash bargaining solution
max
T>[
[x(T)[l] [f(T) +[l]13 s.t. [  \
14Note that if [e  \ binds then [v  \ must bind as well ( A 0). Suppose that this is not true.
Then, [e = \ and [v ? \ . As  approaches 0 Tv A Te. But from (11) and (12) Te ? t = Tv which is
a contradiction.
15The replacement takes into account that in equation (24) we consider a match between a buyer of
household k who holds | units of money. Moreover, we consider a symmetric equilibrium where $ = 
and t = T.
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The benefit of the sequential bargaining procedure, in contrast to the axiomatic Nash bar-
gaining solution, is that it reveals how the agents’ behavior in out-of-equilibrium matches
prevents the economy from attaining the first best under the Friedman rule.
Appendix 2. Observable marginal value of money To derive the envelope condition
when $ is observable, we have to derive the derivatives gt
e
g| and
gtv
g| , respectively. To derive
gte
g| we consider a match between a buyer of the representative household and a seller from
some other household. Furthermore, we set {e = | because in the monetary equilibrium
the constraint {e  | is binding. The terms of trade in such a match satisfy
x0(te)
£
f(te) + l|
¤
= (1 )f0(te)
£
x(te) $|
¤
= (38)
Totally dierentiate (38), and note that in a symmetric equilibrium \ = |, l = $, and
te = t, to get
1
$
gte
g|
=
1 + % (1X (t))
j0(t; )
(39)
where % = g$g|
|
$ is the elasticity of the marginal value of money with respect to |. The
derivative j0(t; ) is defined in (30) and X (t) = x
0(t)
x0(t)+(13)f0(t) . We can distinguish between
a hold-up eect and a strategic eect. The first term in the numerator represents the hold-
up eect. It measure how the buyers consumption changes when | changes holding $
constant. The strategic eect is represented by the second term in the numerator and
measure how the terms-of-trade are aected when the marginal value of money changes in
an out-of-equilibrium match.
The tricky part is to derive % and we are not able to do so. Note, however, that
the strategic eect reduces the additional consumption that a buyer receives in a out-of-
equilibrium match, and consequently will depress the equilibrium value of money if the
marginal value of money is decreasing (% ? 0).16
To derive gt
v
g| we consider a match between a seller of the representative household and
a buyer from some other household. The terms of trade in such a match satisfy
x0 (tv) [f(tv) + $\ ] = (1 )f0(tv) [x(tv) l\ ] = (40)
Totally dierentiate (40) and then impose \ = |, l = $, and tv = t to get
1
$
gtv
g|
=
%X (t)
j0(t; )
(41)
Note that if the marginal value of money is decreasing (% ? 0), then gt
v
g| ? 0. Thus, if % ? 0,
the strategic eect reduces the quantity that a seller has to produce in a out-of-equilibrium
match, and consequently will increase the equilibrium value of money.
16Models with a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings are characterized by a decreasing marginal
value of money. See for example Berentsen (2002), Camera and Corbea (1999), Rocheteau (2000), and
Zhou (1999).
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In order to derive the envelope condition when the marginal value of money $ is ob-
servable, dierentiate (9) with respect to | to get
} (+ $)
µ
1
Uv|
l
¶
 } ($  )
Ã
Ue|
l
!
 ! $}  0 (= 0 if | A 0) (42)
Note that in contrast to the first-order condition in the paper (14), the derivative Ue| in (42)
may be nonzero. This derivative takes into account that when a seller of the representative
household arrives with one additional unit of money in a match, then the buyer may change
its reservation utility because the marginal value of money of the seller’s household may
may be dierent from the equilibrium marginal value of money. Next use (10) and (11) to
eliminate  and  and assume that a monetary equilibrium exists (| A 0) to get
}
x0 (t)
f0 (t)
l
µ
1
Uv|
l
¶
 }
f0 (t)
x0 (t)
Ue|  ! $} = 0 (43)
Use (43) to eliminate ! from the envelope condition (15) to get
$31

= }$
x0(t)
f0(t)
µ
1
Uv|
$
¶
 }
f0 (t)
x0 (t)
Ue| + (1 })$
Then, in a symmetric equilibrium when {$ 0 from (3) and (4) we have Uv| = $f0 (t)
gte
g|
and Ue| = x0 (t)
gtv
g| . Replace U
v
| and Ue| to get
$31

= }
·
x0 (t)
gte
g|
 f0 (t)
gtv
g|
¸
+ (1 })$ (44)
In the steady-state the real value of money $p is constant and we can express the envelope
condition as follows
  
}
= x0 (t)
1
$
gte
g|
 f0 (t)
1
$
gtv
g|
 1 (45)
Note that the left-hand side of (45) is equivalent to the left-hand side of the envelope
condition we have used so far in this paper. In Shi’s approach gt
e
g| =
1
f0(t) and
gtv
g| = 0 so
that (45) simplifies to
  
}
=
x0 (t)
f0 (t)
 1 (46)
Next use (39) and (41) to replace gt
e
g| and
gtv
g| in (45) to get (31).
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